UARD Yearbook
ELEMENTS OF THE VALIDITY OF THE STATE MECHANISMS FOR MONITORING THE CORRUPTION RISK
Abstract
The relevance and significance of the study is due to the importance of understanding the reasons and conditions for corrupt behavior, as well as the state's participation in this process. The study's research object is the monitoring base as a methodology for fighting corruption. A research problem has been set on the development of recommendations in the interest of helping to build a modern concept of countering corruption. The purpose of the studies is to deconstruct the main logics that are used by state entities in their conscious policy, which provides real activities in the field of countering corruption. The research task of the studio is the analysis of the fight against corruption and errors in their implementation. In accordance with the purpose of the work, the author's thesis that there is a unique and at the same time universally applicable methodical and systematic approach to the development and implementation of strategies and efficient measures against corruption and its consequences is set for examination and proof. The research hypothesis of the studies is that the state has sustainable mechanisms of high intensity in the field of monitoring to fight corruption. To achieve the goal of the research, general scientific methods will be used - formal logic with its methods, induction, deduction and analogy; analysis, synthesis, comparison, generalization, typification and abstraction. The author's interpretations of some basic summaries, proving the working hypotheses in the field of the monitoring base, as a methodology for fighting corruption, have also been made. The general conclusion from the application of the research strategy is that the study of the shadow economy is methodologically expedient and constructive, both cognitively and in terms of the possibilities for constructing and correcting national policies. At the end of the research, the author of the current study offers several guidelines to create certain economic mechanisms to minimize corruption risks.
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