ANTI–COMPETITIVENESS AND SMART SPECIALIZATION: LEADERSHIP UNDER END–GAME–BEHAVIOR AND POLICY COSTS
Keywords:
anti–competitiveness, public policy cost, smart specialization (SS).Abstract
The interaction of public policies with good–service markets represents a
necessity for smart specialization. While theories and research explain functionality within
theoretical postulates, little attention is paid to the adaptation of smart strategies and innovation in
anti–competitive conditions. Often within exclusive territories and homogeneous groups, anti–
competitiveness prevents the use of resources in new ways and goals, by limiting the potential for
innovation in processes, technologies, markets and institutions, and highlighting leadership as cause
and effect. The paper provides an analysis of the impact of leadership on innovation adoption, smart
specialization policy and strategies, examining the potential policy gains or costs. The literature
review, comparative analysis, public goods game theory and expertise were used to build the
theoretical framework of the case study. The findings suggest that, while leadership dominates,
unclear processes or un–public goals reduce trust, and under the end–game–effect of participant
behavior, public policy costs may increase, making successful innovation non–winner.
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