GLOBAL NETWORKS AND THE DARK WEB AS A PLATFORM FOR THE DISSEMINATION OF BIOTERRORIST CAPACITY: FROM CYBERCRIME TO BIORISK AND NATIONAL SECURITY
Keywords:
Cyberbiosecurity; Dark Web; global networks; biorisk; bioterrorist capability; dual-use; genetic data; data breach; ransomware; national security.Abstract
The digitalization of biology—genomic databases, automated laboratory
workflows, cloud services, and AI-enabled bioinformatics—reshapes biological security by making
it directly dependent on cyber resilience. This study examines how global digital networks and Dark
Web infrastructures can accelerate the dissemination of “bioterrorist capability” in a broad sense:
not only through potential access to hazardous materials, but through an enabling ecosystem for
dual-use knowledge, grey/illicit markets for health products, misuse of sensitive biomedical data,
and cybercriminal services that can translate into real-world biorisk. The research applies a
qualitative design combining a review of cyberbiosecurity and dual-use governance frameworks
(WHO, 2022; United States Government, 2024), analysis of publicly available institutional reports
on health-sector cyber threats and organised crime (ENISA, 2023; Europol, 2025a; Europol,
2025b), and a case study of a regulator-documented genetic data breach (ICO, 2025).
Findings highlight three converging risk pathways: (1) anonymous ecosystems can amplify
distribution channels for counterfeit or unregulated health products (Europol, 2025a); (2) genetic
and health data breaches show how biologically meaningful information becomes a tradable asset
enabling extortion, fraud, and erosion of trust (ICO, 2025); and (3) ransomware and related
incidents in healthcare can disrupt critical services and endanger patient safety, thereby manifesting
as biorisk without a biological agent (ENISA, 2023). The discussion frames these dynamics as
hybrid threats, where state and non-state actors combine cyber means, criminal networks, and
information influence below the threshold of formal warfare (NATO, n.d.; Council of the European
Union, n.d.; Europol, 2025b). The study concludes that national security should treat
cyberbiosecurity as an integrated resilience function—strengthening data protection, securing
supply chains and health/lab systems, implementing early warning, and governing dual-use in line
with non-proliferation obligations (United Nations, 2004
References
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